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Eric THE CHINESE 
Aarons REVOLUTION
One of the editors of A LR  zuho lived in China during 1951- 
5-/ discusses some implications of the Chinese revolution in 
an article based on a report given to the National Executive  
of the C om m unist Party in August.
BY ANY STA N D A R D  the Chinese R evolution, consum m ated on 
O ctober 1 1949 and  whose 20th A nniversary is now being celebrated, 
m ust be counted  one of the greatest events in hum an history. I t has 
been an  epic of revolutionary  devotion and creativeness, both  in 
action and  thought, releasing the energies of scores or hundreds ol 
million^ of people in  C hina and  th ro u g h o u t the world.
T h e  Chinese R evolu tion  has revealed even m ore sharply anti 
richly the weight of the specifically n a tiona l in revolutionary deve­
lopm ent, bo th  because m any of these features had  tended to be 
elevated to  the level of universality w hen there  was only one “m odel"
— a fairly n a tu ra l tendency bu t taken to great extrem es under 
S talin —  an d  also because, while every n a tion  has its peculiarity, 
the Chinese n a tion  is m ore “peculiarly  n a tiona l"  th an  any other. 
T h is  is to  be seen in  its great size, w ith  a popu la tio n  exceeding 
th a t of N o rth  and  South Am erica and  the Soviet U nion  com bined; 
in  the fact th a t C hina has had  the longest continuous history as an 
at least partia lly  unified state; tha t u p  till the last two or three 
h u n d red  years it had  the highest level of cu ltu re  in  the world; 
th a t its size, cu ltu ra l level and  basically self-sufficient na tu re  as a 
whole and  by regions m eant th a t no o th e r n a tion  or com bination  
of nations was able to  successfully colonise m ore than  a small 
p a rt of it; and  the specific way — years long arm ed struggle m ainly 
in  ru ra l areas — in w hich the revolution  developed and  trium phed.
W hen to all this is added the now-being-realised com plexity of 
the theoretical an d  practical problem s involved in the revolutionary 
movem ent, the  construction of socialism, and  the developm ent of 
p roper re la tions betw een socialist countries, the difficulty of accur­
ately assessing the position in  C hina an d  its place in  the world is 
given deserved em phasis, as is the need for patience and  recogni­
tion tha t the problem s involved are very long term.
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T h e  Issues in the Cultural R evolu tion
In the first year or so of the C u ltu ra l R evo lu tion  it was clear 
enough tha t there was an  intense power struggle, and th a t there 
were issues involved regarded by the protagonists as vital, b u t it 
was not then very clear just w hat the issues were. T h e  relation 
between policies and  the struggle for pow er is com plex. T here  
are few m ajor pow er struggles w ithout policies being involved, and 
just as policies a ttrac t people, people a ttrac t policies, and  the p e r­
sonal im prin t of p ro m in en t leaders can be very great, as is obviously 
the case w ith M ao Tse-tung.
Stated briefly, the overall issue involved in  the C u ltu ra l R evolu­
tion was how to b u ild  a m odern socialist country ou t of a vast bu t 
poor agricu ltural country; w here the specific conditions include 
active hostility  from  the U nited  States, the break w ith  the Soviet 
U nion, the question ing  of some aspects at least of the Soviet m odel 
of socialism, and  the im pact of the scientific and  technological 
revolution which in  a way com pounds the problem s of “sim ple” 
industrialisation. P u t in  ano ther way, the over-all issue was the 
search for a Chinese way to solve these problem s. T h is  raises 
a num ber of m ore concrete issues w hich I w ill discuss here first 
of all from  the p o in t of view of seeking th e ir  positive and ra tional 
content, and  then  a ttem p t a critique of them.
1 M oral versus m ateria l incentives.
Involved here are a n u m b er of o ther questions such as “econom- 
ism ” in factories and  trade unions, the a ttitu d e  to the .economic 
reforms being adop ted  in  o ther socialist countries, the rate of 
collectivisation and  of com m une-isation in  the countryside, the 
role of private plots, of free m arkets, the a ttitu d e  to “rich  peasants”, 
and  the emphasis, especially in  the ru ra l com m unes, on general 
d istribu tion  out of the com m on fund  com pared w ith  paym ent for 
actual work units perform ed.
It is a tru ism  to say th a t bo th  m oral an d  m ateria l incentives 
are necessary —  in  fact they exist in  all socialist countries. T h e  
question is ra th e r  one of degree, of emphasis, w hich also may change 
from  time to time. T h e re  seems to be no theoretically  determ inable 
optim um . But i t  is on the degree of m ateria l incentive com pared 
w ith tha t of m oral th a t the Soviet practice has come in  for consider­
able criticism. N o com prehensive analysis of incomes in  the Soviet 
U nion  so far as I know  exists, b u t from sources available it seems 
th a t from unskilled to  highly skilled there m ight be a factor of 
three; for m anagers and  experts, counting  o ther privileges, the 
factor m ight be six; an d  for those in the top  adm in istra tion  of 
party  and  state this m igh t be doubled again. Such differences 
undoubted ly  con ta in  a tendency to become “castified” an d  give rise 
to certain “vested in terests.”
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In  the early days of the revolution  L enin  faced the problem , 
and  w rote enthusiastically  about “subbo tn iks” —  voluntary  u n ­
paid  w ork on Sundays:
Com m unism  begins when the  rank-and-file workers begin to display a self- 
sacrificing concern th a t is u n d aun ted  by arduous toil for increasing productivity 
of labor, for husbanding  every pood of grain, coal, iron and o ther products, 
which do  no t accrue to  the  workers personally o r to their “close” k ith  and kin, 
b u t to th e ir “d is tan t” k ith  and kin, i.e. to society as a whole, to tens and 
hundreds of m illions of people un ited  first in  one socialist state, and then  in a 
U nion of Soviet Republics.i
O n the o th e r hand , in  the conditions of misery existing in  Soviet 
Russia a t the  end  of the civil war, in  the  controversy over the trade 
unions, L en in  had  em phasised the need to give preference in  con­
sum ption  to  aid  the developm ent of p roduction .2 A t an earlier 
stage, in  1918 L enin  had  confessed th a t the eq ua lita rian  principles 
of the Paris C om m une could no t be app lied  in  the circum stances and 
th a t it  was sensible to  pay h igh  salaries for the tim e being to ex­
perts.3 L a te r the Stakhanovites (shock workers) exercised a form  of 
m oral influence while also receiving com paratively h igh wages. 
T hese an d  o ther experiences ind icate  th a t there are no readily 
definable or absolute standards in  this m atter.
L enin  h ad  also, in  discussing the Subbotniks po in ted  to the role 
of the m oral factor in  breaking  th rough  the problem  of low produc­
tivity and  starvation;
W e know th a t in  practice such contradictions are solved by breaking the  vicious 
circle, by b ring ing  about a radical change in  th e  m ood of the  masses by the 
heroic in itia tive  of ind iv idual groups which, against the  background of such a 
radical change, often plays a decisive role.*
T h ere  can be no dou b t in  the  m ind  of anyone who has visited 
C hina a t any tim e in  the last 20 years of the impressiveness of the 
m oral fervor and  enthusiasm  w hich has existed on a mass scale.
T h e  level of m ateria l rewards p articu larly  of the mass of peasants 
in  a peasant country, is also re la ted  to  the basic prob lem  of the 
so-called “prim itive socialist accum ulation .” In  Russia repression 
on a big scale was practised no t only in  the struggle against the 
kulaks, b u t also to  enforce a policy of keeping the countryside 
relatively backw ard technically and  cu ltu ra lly  so th a t funds would 
be available for industries and  cities. A g reater em phasis on m oral 
factors com bined w ith  a greater developm ent of industry  and  cul-
1 "A G reat B eginning”, in  the collection M arx-Engels-M arxism.
2 See Vol. 9 Selected Works, p. 13.
3 “T h e  Im m ediate  Tasks of the  Soviet G overnm ent”, Vol. 7 Selected Works, pp. 
322-3.
* "A G reat B eginning”.
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lure, even at a yet prim itive level, th rough  the Com m unes in 
C hina, cannot therefore be discounted as a possible alternative.
2 T h e  k ind of expert and  the kind of education.
M uch Chinese m ateria l contains a general (though no t absolute) 
tendency to decry experts as necessarily becom ing separated from  the 
masses, of an a ttitu d e  of superiority  to  the masses being  developed 
when m ental labor is separated from  m anual and  w hen there is 
a great gap in  living standards (it should perhaps be po in ted  out 
th a t the gap  betw een in tellectuals and  masses in  C h in a  has been 
trad itionally  m uch greater th an  we are accustom ed to). Consequ­
ently  a tendency to shorten  and  change form al education, a re­
newed and  greater em phasis on “going to the villages”, an  em phasis 
on self-reliance and  indigenous m ethods, and  a general struggle to 
prevent cadres and  experts consolidating in to  a “new  class” of 
organisation men, have been stressed.
3 T h e  “L ittle  R ed  B ook” of M ao quotations lends itself to being 
m ade fun of, b u t makes m ore sense if seen as a type of new m oral 
code replacing the C onfucian w hich perm eated every pore of 
Chinese society for hundreds of years. Sim ilarly the figure of Mao, 
together w ith the red  book can be taken as a un ify ing  an d  rallying 
po in t of a na tion  trad itionally  and  (at the present stage of develop­
m ent) inevitably, displaying strong centrifugal tendencies.
4 T h e  red  book could  be considered to  be a cu ltu ra l factor in  
the sense of a m oral code as m entioned  above, an d  there was a 
cam paign against en trenched  and  old cu ltu ra l forms, as well as 
foreign ones.
5 T h e  C u ltu ra l R evolution , genuinely to a degree a t least, d id  
harness the sp irit of enthusiasm , self-sacrifice and  revolutionary  
energy of youth, an d  some have praised M ao as the first political 
figure to consciously set ou t to do this in  today’s context.
6 All the above are in  general re la ted  to  m ethods such as reliance 
on mass movem ents an d  “big leaps”, and  “ideological rem ou ld ing” 
ra th e r than  physical suppression (though this was also present), 
and  theories, exam ined  later, abou t class struggle u n d e r socialism.
7 W hatever ra tiona lity  an d  practicality  is contained  in  the  above 
policies w hich were a t issue, is given g reater p o in t if re la ted  to  
expectations of ex ternal attack, som ething th a t appears in  a ra th e r 
different ligh t now, follow ing the invasion of Czechoslovakia, than  
it did before, while im perialism  has continued  to th rea ten . T h u s  
dispersal of m uch of industry  in  ru ra l areas and  com m unes, and 
em phasis on local self-sufficiency w ith sm aller, less sophisticated 
and  im provised industries, w hich m ay be less efficient on  a purely  
economic basis th an  concentration  on highly centralised  large-scale
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m odern industry, makes more sense if a p ro tracted  w ar on Chinese 
territo ry  is envisaged. Sim ilarly the em phasis on self-reliance and 
sim plicity of equ ipm ent in the army. Except for the Bomb. But 
I hen the stress on m oral as opposed to m aterial incentives could 
become a necessary con tribu tion  to  the diversion of resources to 
production  of the Bomb, w hether as pow er symbol, or deterrent, 
o r both.
l in t  W i l l  I t  W ork ?
T hese ra tiona l aspects exist and canno t be ignored, bu t many 
com m entators sym pathetic to C hina see merely these and  tu rn  a 
b lind  eye to o ther aspects and  considerations, such as
1 T h e  m oral and  the m aterial are easy to see separately in simple 
forms of m anual labor, bu t it is a very different m atter in highly 
com plex industries and  an in tegrated  economy. People in one 
section of a large factory, o r in all sections, may th ink  they are 
w orking well, bu t often cannot really assess the results of their 
work directly, and  need recourse to econom ic categories w hich can 
sum  u p  the whole, such as profitability. Joan  R obinson correctly 
points ou t th a t there is a difference between profits as a criterion 
of efficiency and as an incentive, b u t goes on to say tha t the Chinese 
claim  tha t the one inevitably leads to the o ther.5 But if such 
econom ic m eans are no t em ployed the results of “m oral fervor” 
may not be readily m easured or effectively a tta ined  and so may 
become m ore difficult to  m ain ta in  as tim e goes on.
Also, w hen the atm osphere is such and  there is the social pressure 
to  conform , it may be possible to  m a in ta in  hard  m anual labor in 
a team  for qu ite  a long time. B ut w ithou t a m aterial incentive as 
well, it well may prove m ore difficult to get people to pu t time 
an d  effort in to  the acquiring  of new, unaccustom ed skills. T h a t is, 
there well could be, and in  fact seems to have been, m ore difficulties 
in the factories.
And is the reliance on the m oral factor actually as great as is 
made out? D ifferentiation of incomes is one thing, bu t the prospect 
of m ateria l gain  m ade collectively is, a t least from  time to time, 
em phasised. For exam ple M ao Tse-tung:
We should do  everything possible to enable the peasants in norm al years to 
raise their personal incomes year by year on the  basis of increased production .”
Furtherm ore, there are very big differences in incomes in different 
parts of the country. Colin M ackerras records ann u al com m une
ft i l ic  C ultural R evolution  in China, Penguin, 1969, p . 13.
<• On the Correct H andling  o f Contradictions A m ong the People, Foreign L an­
guages Press. Peking. 1957. p. 86.
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incomes (apart from  private  plots etc., w hich still exist) ranging  
from  SU.S.25 w ithou t add itional grain to SU.S.200 plus g ra in .7
A nother observer gives the average ann u al wage of an industria l 
worker as over $U.S.300,8 and  I should be surprised if people 
“higher u p ’’ do no t get still h igher incomes, on a graded scale, as 
they did when I was in  C hina.
W hy cannot m oral incentive (working for the good of d istan t 
k ith  and kin) overcome these great discrepancies? T ru e , it is m ore 
difficult the m ore d istan t the k ith  and  kin are, b u t some better 
exp lanation  is needed th an  Jo an  R obinson’s com m ent th a t “political 
danger” and  “econom ic efficiency” preclude this at p resent.9 T h is 
may be so, bu t it could then  be th a t the same situation  and  econom ic 
considerations are opera ting  in  o ther socialist countries.
A nother w riter gives as one of the reasons for the em phasis on 
decentralisation and  indigenous m ethods ra th e r th an  concentration 
in  m odern industry, no t only the problem  of tran sp o rt for m aterials 
and the products of feeder industries, bu t the  difficulty of deciding 
between conflicting claims of jealous provinces.10 W hy cannot 
m oral incentive be b rough t to bear to solve this problem ?
2 M odern industry  —  and  especially in  these days of the scientific 
and  technological revolu tion  —  dem ands an  increasing num ber 
of highly educated an d  creative people, and  these can really only 
develop fully in  conditions of freedom , b o th  from  pressing m ateria l 
worries and  ideological strictures. A nd even if dispersed, smaller, 
and  more im provised industries will suffice in  m any cases, it cannot 
do so in  the nuclear field, in  rockets, a ircraft, electronics, oxygen- 
steel production  etc. no t to speak of m ore social spheres of activity 
involving the tra in in g  of socialist economists, bankers, traders, and  
adm inistrators for the w hole country. A nd as po in ted  ou t earlier, 
skilled workers in  m odern  factories may no t prove so easy to come 
by. Yet the trade unions have been destroyed as hotbeds of “econom- 
ism .” C onsequently  the proclaim ed princip les w ill have to be 
m odified considerably if the Chinese are to a tta in  ends w hich they 
undoubted ly  do w ant to a tta in . T h e  rate of catching u p  w ith  o ther 
countries, w hich depends to  qu ite  a degree on the above, m ay also 
become a political, m oral factor w hich could generate a t least 
some conditions for a “C oun ter C u ltu ra l R evo lu tion” to  b ring  it 
about.
T Colin Mackerras and Neale H u n te r, China Observed, Nelson, 1967, p. 43.
8 Hans Granqvist, T he R ed  Guard, Nelson, 1967, p. 6.
I* The Cultural R evo lu tion  in China, p . 37.
10 Bruce M cFarlane “Developm ents in  the  C ultu ral R evolution”, O utlook, No. 3,
1968.
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Ancl w hile com batting  the developm ent of bureaucracy am ong 
cadres, adm inistrators and  experts is com m endable, may no t one set 
of bureaucrats have been replaced by another? T h ere  is the situation 
arising from  the un-arguable dem and for acceptance tha t “M ao is 
rig h t” before any dem ocratic discussion is allowed (outside of this, 
the new set-up may be less bureaucratic  for a time.) B ut is it not 
also necessary to tackle this endem ic problem  in o ther ways as well? 
As Jo an  R obinson  recognises:
T o  develop a m odern industria l state . . . needs planning, coordination and 
unified com m and. A governm ent hierarchy working through a bureaucratic 
appara tus cannot be dispensed w ith . . . T h e  C u ltu ra l Revolution has swung 
the balance violently against organisation towards popular spontaneity; how 
can it be kept from gradually  creeping back?n
3 T h e  need for a national unifying figure such as M ao in  the 
conditions of C hina may be accepted, b u t the question of degree is 
surely of im portance. In  my view there is com pletely unrestrained 
adu la tion  and  a reckless releasing of nationalism . W here will it 
lead and  how can it be stopped? A m oral code is good so far as 
it goes if its precepts are good, b u t as an un th ink ing ly  accepted, 
absolute tru th  w hich is pu t beyond question  it works against ra tio n ­
ality, the developm ent of free m inds and  dem ocratic processes. 
T h e re  is strong evidence of a m arkedly less degree of reasoning out 
and  w illingness to  discuss all sides and  all points of view in Chinese 
m ateria l pub lished  over the last three years th an  there was over 
fifteen years ago when I was there, and  this I believe is a bad  sign.
4 G etting  rid  of backward elem ents of cu lture  is good, bu t 
no t if it  is indiscrim inately directed against the heritage of the 
past. I still believe L enin  was right, in  his address to the youth  in  
192012 to  p o in t ou t th a t one could no t become a com m unist w ithout 
acqu iring  the sum of hum an  knowledge, th a t this was how m arxism  
arose, an d  th a t it was certainly not enough to  learn com m unist (or 
little  red  book?) slogans. A nd it is h a rd  indeed to accept that 
Beethoven should  be considered as a bourgeois co rrup to r of the 
youth.
5 T h e  above and  o ther negative sides of the m obilisation  of 
the youth  in  the R ed  G uard  cannot be overlooked o r accepted 
merely as an  exigency in  a b itte r po litical struggle. If the youth 
have been released from  one conform ity, have they no t been plunged 
still m ore deeply in to  another? T h e re  is also evidence of cynicism 
being generated, and  of d isorien tation  in  app lication  to study for 
exam ple, w hich may no t be so readily  overcom e.13
11 T h e  C ultural R evo lu tion  in China, p. 43.
>- L enin , "T h e  Tasks of the  Y outh Leagues", in  M arx-Engels-M arxism.
13 See China Observed, C hapter 14.
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(i Mass m ovem ents and big leaps certainly have a vital place in 
the developm ent ol socialist society, (the first five year p lan  in the 
Soviet U nion was a big leap and a mass m ovem ent), bu t they are 
lar Irom being a un iversa lly  applicable m ethod. If they are treated 
as such and continually  repeated, may not they produce dim inishing 
returns? Ideological rem ould ing  can be a pow erful and useful 
m ethod, bu t carried to extrem es it can be as pa in fu l as a gaol 
sentence for political non conformists.
T o  sum up, the policies now in operation  as the  result of the 
victory of Mao in the C u ltu ra l R evolution have chances of some 
success, bu t contain m any negative features which, if uncorrected, 
will h inder econom ic and  social progress and may produce a politic al 
reaction. T here  is some evidence however tha t the policies may be 
modified m ore in  practice than  the absoluteness of the words used 
suggest. T h e  ex ternal influences could well be decisive in determ in­
ing the course of fu tu re  developm ents.
T h e  Power Struggle
1 his was a m ajor p a rt of the C u ltu ra l R evolution, an d  was waged 
w ith great intensity, even m ore than  other pow er struggles in the 
Chinese C om m unist Party, w hich have a long history. I t seems tha t 
there developed in  the la tte r half of the ’th irties a long term  
alliance between M ao Tse-tung and  L iu  Shao-chi w hich carried 
th rough to the 7th Congress of the Party in  1945 and  after.
T h e  period ’49 to ’57 is som ething of a mystery, in  th a t although 
M ao’s prestige nationally  and  in ternationally  was at its height, 
in  in ternal affairs a t least he seemed, uncharacteristically , to take 
som ething of a back seat. Few speeches or w-ritings are a ttrib u ted  
to him  in this period. Perhaps this is a ttrib u tab le  to M ao’s lack ol 
fam iliarity, com pared w ith others, w ith the new conditions of 
shifting head-quarters to the cities and  concentration  on problem s 
of industrialisation , w ith a considerable degree of reliance on 
Soviet experience and  Soviet assistance.11 A part from  the three- 
antis and five-antis ideological rem ould ing  cam paigns15 the one 
big domestic issue on w hich M ao seems to have exerted  himself 
was over the rate  of collectivisation (which M ao w anted  speeded 
up  in  1955). In  1954 there had  been the struggle against Kao Kang,
n  T here  is conclusive evidence th a t Mao's works were re vam ped somewhat in 
this period probably  w ith  Soviet participation  to m ake them  m ore "orthodox 
m arxist” th an  they originally  were. He was also patronised , not for the  first 
time, as a “peasant leader.” His resentm ent may well be im agined. See, for 
exam ple, Schram, M ao Tse-tung.
l ”> Against waste, bureaucracy and corruption , and against b ribery  of govern­
m ent personnel, tax evasion, theft of State property, cheating  on governm ent con­
tracts, and stealing economic inform ation.
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an im p o rtan t figure in  the N orth  east an d  Jao  Shu-shih. It seems 
generally accepted th a t L iu (and Chou En-lai) were the im m ediate 
targets of Kao, b u t it is also possible th a t M ao wras the ultim ate 
target, and  tha t this helped to cement the M ao-Liu alliance lot a 
fu rth er period.
M ao played a m ino r role in the 8th Congress in 1956, m aking a 
very hum bly w orded opening speech. Reference to the T h o u g h t 
of M ao was om itted  from  the new constitu tion  adopted at this 
Congress, f t is said tha t M ao chastised his comrades afterwards, 
saying th a t the decisions of the Congress appeared “ left" bu t were 
in fact “rig h t.”
In 1958, p robably  associated w ith an  extensive tour undertaken  
by M ao, came the mass developm ent of the people’s com m unes and 
the ‘great leap forw ard”, w hich for a tim e seemed to carry all 
before it. T h e  six th  m eeting of the C entral Com m ittee m eeting in 
D ecem ber was apparen tly  still seized w ith  this. T h is m eeting 
repeated  the ex travagant claims about p roduction  in tha t year and 
targets for 1959 (steel was claim ed to have increased from 5.35 m il­
lion tons in  1957 to 11 m illion  in 1958, and  18 m illion  was projected 
for 1959; the figures for coal for these years were given as 130, 270 
and  380 m illion  tons; grain  185, 375, and  525 m illion  tons; cotton 
1.64, 3.35 and  5 m illion  tons.) T h e  tim e for transition  to ow ner­
ship by the w'hole people (as distinct from  collective ownership) 
was given as 3 to 6 years, or a little  longer, and  “some years” after 
the transition  to com plete com m unism  was envisaged.
Yet it was a t this m eeting tha t M ao announced  his in ten tio n  not 
to stand for C hairm anship  of the State (he rem ained C hairm an of 
the Party), saying tha t he w ould be able then  “to set aside more 
tim e for m arxist-leninist theoretical w ork.”38 Know ing som ething 
of how such decisions are arrived at, it seems certain  th a t it was 
m ade at least some m onths before, a t the height of the apparen t 
success of the great leap. A possible exp lanation  for this may be 
th a t M ao felt in te rna l problem s were w^ell on the way to solution, 
and  th a t he could concentrate on ex ternal problem s, particularly  
the grow ing differences w ith the CPSU.
In  A ugust 1959, w ith revision of the exaggerations of the great 
leap still going on, defence m inister Peng T eh-huai was dismissed 
apparen tly  for having earlier in  the year “launched  a fierce on­
slaught on the P arty ’s general line,”17 and  on the leadership of
16 R esolution of C entral Com m ittee, published in  Peking Review  No. 43, Dec. 
23, 1958.
17 “ R esolution of 8th Plenary Session of E igh th  C entral Com m ittee of CPC 
concerning the A nti-Party  C lique H eaded by Peng T eh -h u a i” , excerpts published 
in Peking R eview  No. 34, August 18, 1967.
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.Mao. He and others associated w ith h im  were declared to have 
been linked w ith Kao Kang, and  there were im plications tha t both 
were in league w ith  the Soviet U nion. Peng is said to have 
urged a m odernly equ ip p ed  army, w ith , reliance on the Soviet 
U nion in this respect. Peng was replaced by L in Piao, and il ap ­
pears certain  th a t M ao set out 011 a long course to  ensure that, 
w ith L in ’s assistance, the arm y w ould be loyal to h im  (a sort ol 
precursor of the C u ltu ra l R evolution was carried  ou t in the an m  
before it wras launched  in  the nation  as a whole) and  to overcome 
t lie damage done to his prestige.
T h e  insistence w ith w hich it has been claim ed d u rin g  the C u l­
tu ra l R evolution  th a t any losses in  the great leap were m ade good 
in  the recent period, for exam ple the cu rren t use of buildings 
erected in  tha t period, and  the venom  w ith  w hich detractors 
of the great leap18 are still denounced, indicates th a t m any m ore 
th an  Peng were involved, bu t why they allowed him  to be sacrificed, 
o r could not p revent it, is no t clear.
For some years after this, cautious, pragm atic, and m ore “incen­
tive-oriented” policies were pursued to overcome the afterm ath  of 
the great leap, the n a tu ra l calam ities, and  the w ithdraw al of Soviet 
technicians. O n the ex ternal front, w ith  w hich M ao seems to 
have been m ost closely associated, there seems to have been a 
rem arkable degree of un ity  in  the intense cam paign launched 
against Soviet policies in  general and “K hruschov revisionism ” in 
particu lar, despite some m inor dark  h in ts d u rin g  the C ultural 
R evolution th a t L iu  and  his associates were prepared  to seek some 
accom m odation w ith  the Soviet U nion.
However some sort of paralysis of the party  appara tus set in  d u r­
ing this period, p robably  reflecting the inab ility  of e ither side to 
m uster the forces to  overcome the other. M ao had, despite the 
failure of the great leap still considerable prestige am ong the masses 
and had secured support of the army. L iu and  T en g  had  the party  
and  governm ent apparatus. T h e  stalem ate is shown in the absence 
of C entral Com m ittee meetings, which were supposed, under the 
1956 constitu tion, to be held  at least twice a year, w hich was ob­
served up  to the m eeting  in  A ugust 1959 at which Peng T eh-huai 
was sacked. T h e  nex t was held  in  1961, and  n o th in g  was reported  
of it. T here  was an o th er in  Septem ber 1962 which m ade im portan t
T here  are few statistics on the  losses in the “great leap ". One authority , 
Uchida, in Scientific A m erican, Nov. ’66, claims th a t 400,000 backyard furnaces 
tor m aking iron  were b u ilt, of which only 300 have rem ained and been developed. 
These are said to produce now about one th ird  of C hina's iron  and steel. Ol 
course critics claim, on the  face of it w ith some justice, th a t even if some sudi 
“great leap” products are now used, the  re tu rn  on outlay is m uch less than 
w ould have been if used m ore rationally .
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changes in ihc secretarial, and the next was not held till August 
1966 w here M ao was able to m uster a small m ajority. T h e  last 
was held  in  O ctober 1968, a prelude to the calling of the 9th C on­
gress in  A pril 1969, w hich set tlie* seal for the present on Mao's 
\ ic to n .
Four stages in tlie developm ent of the C u ltu ra l R evolution have 
been set ou t in a speech a ttrib u ted  to M ao T se-tung.1" T h e  first 
was the pub lica tion  in N ovem ber 196j  of an attack on the w riter 
W u H an  for his play T he  Dismissal of H ai Jtii, w hich is said, 
probably  w ith justification, to be a defence of Peng T eh-huai. T h e  
au th o r of this attack  was Yao W en-Yuan, Mao's son-in-law. Pre­
ceding this (February '6')) there was a great new spate of praise 
for M ao, whose works were reported  to be h a rd  to get in 196-1, and 
a new em phasis on political subjec ts in the curricula of the schools.-" 
B ut perhaps the decisive move was the issuing of the May 16, 196(5 
“C ircu lar of the C entral C om m ittee" w hich launched the violent 
a ttack  on Peng Chen, M ayor of Peking, beg inning  the struggle to 
get at Liu.
T h is c ircu lar may have arisen from  a reported  m eeting in  Shan­
ghai of M ao, L in  Piao, Chou En-lai and  others, w hich probably 
also organised the forces for the C en tra l C om m ittee m eeting in 
August. In  this period too (May 1966) the first “Big C haracter 
Poster" was p u t up  in  Peking U niversity by a young w om an N ieh 
Y uan-t/u  (later elected a candidate m em ber of the C entral Com ­
m ittee at the 19th Congress), w hich was im m ediately praised by- 
Mao, and  signalled the beginning of the R ed  G uard  m ovem ent, 
w hich was to last for m ore than  two years and  closed the schools 
and  universities.
T h e  second stage is p u t as being irom  the C entral Com m ittee 
m eeting in  A ugust ’66 to the “Jan u ary  storm " of 1967, which was 
focussed on the key city of Shanghai. T h e  struggle there raged 
back ancl fo rth  for m ost of th a t year. O n Jan u ary  9, 1967, the 
Shanghai W orkers R evolutionary  R ebel G eneral H eadquarters ancl 
thirty-one o ther rebel organisations issued an “U rgent N otice” to all 
Shanghai people. I t contained a ten-poin t proposal, expressing 
their com m on in terest in  dealing a heavy blow to the “bourgeois 
reactionary  lin e .” T h e  notice nu llified  m any acts previously issued 
by the P arty  and  the M unicipal G overnm ent of Shanghai.-1
From  then  began the th ird  stage of “ trip le  alliances” (of leaders
" \  Xalk on Strategic D ispositions’’ A eu' L e ft Review  No. 51, M arch-A pril 1969. 
->n Colin M ackcrras, China Observed, C hapters 0 and 12.
- 1 The Chinese C ultural R evolution: Selected D ocum ents, K. H . Fan Fxl., M onth­
ly Review Press, 1968, p . 26.
20
AI S I R A 1.1 AN I F.l I REVIEW October-Novem ber 1961)
ol ilic new revolutionary  organisations, representatives of the Peo­
ple s L iberation  Army in the area, and an acceptable section of the 
leading cadres) and  the so-called “seizure of pow er" from  the old 
slate and party apparatus.-- These trip le alliances were often u n ­
able to be lorm ed or split ap art after being form ed, bu t were 
reform ed and  gradually  spread over the country.23
1 he iourtli stage was the all-out attack on L iu  Shao-chi beginning 
in M arch-April 1908, w hile a filth may be identified w ith  the 
C entral Com m ittee m eeting  in October, and  the 9th Congress 
in A pril this year.
A great deal could be said abou t the venom  w ith  w hich the 
struggle was waged, and  the unprincip led  n a tu re  of m any of the 
charges m ade long a lte r  the events to w hich they referred. 1 will 
deal w ith the problem  in general later, and here give just one, bu t 
(jtiite typical exam ple. In the article published on Septem ber 20, 
1903, Peking Revieu>, No. 30 “O n the question of S ta lin”, one of 
m any replies to a le tte r from  the CPSU by the E dito ria l D epart­
m ents ol People s Daily  and R ed  Flag, w ith all of w hich M ao m ust 
have been closely associated, we read:
In the late twenties, the th irties and the  early and m iddle forties, the  Chinese 
M arxist-I.eninists represented  by Comrades Mao T se-tung and  L iu Shao-chi 
resisted the influence of Stalin's mistakes; they gradually  overcame the  erroneous 
lines of "Left" and R ight opportunism  and finally led the Chinese revolution 
lo \ idol v.
I hey (the C PS l ) have no t m ade an overall historical and scientific analysis 
ol his life and work b u t have completely negated him  w ithout any distinction 
between right and wrong. T hey  have treated  Stalin not as a com rade bu t as
an enemy.
If one compares the  rem arks m ade by Khrushchov when Stalin was alive with 
those m ade after his death , one will no t fail to see th a t K hrushchov has m ade a 
180-degree tu rn  in his evaluation of Stalin.
It is not necessary to belabor the po in t of the different evalua­
tions of Litt as he appears in  this quo ta tion  in  1963 and  in  writings 
about him  in 1968, or the wholesale negation of the w ork of a m an
— on m uch less evidence, be it noted, than  is available in  the case 
of S ta lin .-1
\ \  ha t is the overall result of four years of intense inner-party  and 
“class” struggle? It is undoub ted ly  a victory for Mao, b u t despite 
the fact th a t the opposition  has been overwhelm ed, it does no t seem 
lo be an overw helm ing victory. T h e  constitu tion  adop ted  at the
- -  See for exam ple L. Aarons, Tribune , M arch 8, 1967.
- :l Mao Tse-tung, "T alk  on Strategic Dispositions", X L it  No. 54, p. 34.
- t  See also Ind ictm en t w ith o u t Trial, T he  Case of L iu  Shao-chi, by A. E. Kent, 
W orking Paper No. 11, D epartm en t of In terna tional Relations, A ustralian N a­
tional University, 1969.
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‘till Congress says “Com rade L in Piao is Com rade M ao Tse-tung's 
dose comrade-in-arms and successor". N am ing  a successor in a 
constitu tion  is unprecedented  in a C om m unist Party and, so lar 
as 1 know, in any republican type constitu tion . It certainly hardly 
speaks lo r a stable situation.
On the 21 m em ber Political B ureau are M ao and  his wife, Lin 
and  his wile, M ao's son-in-law, Chu T e h  who is over HO and has 
played little  role for m any years, and  a num ber of M ao's closest 
associates, i t  is no slighting of the women as such to say tha t Mao's 
wife was little  heard  of till recently, w hile even less achievements 
are known of concerning L in ’s wife.
T h ere  are reports of problem s in ru n n in g  the factories w ith the 
new leadership, and  in  general, m oral incentives notw ithstanding, 
the new policies will have to show th a t they can “deliver the 
goods". M ao’s death, should it occur relatively soon, could cause 
considerable problem s of succession (despite the constitution), 
and in continu ity  of ]>olicies. N evertheless the present M ao team 
m ust be considered as pretty  firmly in  the saddle for qu ite  some 
tim e to come. T h e  biggest “unknow n” is the course and consequ­
ences of an extension of the m ilitary  conflict w ith the Soviet U nion.
T h e  Chinese View of World Revolutionary Strategy
l used w ith the trad itiona l Chinese view of the world m entioned 
at the beginning  and  of their views on socialism and socialist theory, 
is a view of the fu rth er course of the w orld socialist revolution. 
T h is  is based on the conceptions of experiences ol the ir own 
struggle elevated to a w orld level — arm ed struggle as the form  ol 
struggle, su rround ing  the city from  the countryside, and the view 
tha t the Chinese form  of socialism is the one  universal form. Says 
I,in  Piao:
t aking the  en tile  globe, if N orth America and  W estern Europe can be called 
" th e  cities of the world", then  Asia, Africa and L atin  America constitu te “the 
ru ra l areas of the  w orld".-'1
O uitc  consistent, then, w ith  all this, is M ao's claim  th a t “the 
Chinese road is the only one to lib e ra tio n ” . H e then goqs on, having 
spoken of C h ina’s industria l and  m ilitary  developm ents: “China 
should no t only be the political centre of the w orld revolution. 
It m ust also become the m ilitary and  technical centre of the world 
revo lu tion ."-1
In view of this, and  in  view of the long grow ing and now extremely 
intense conflict w ith the Soviet U nion  described elsewhere in  this
"Long Live the  Victory of People's W ar" in  People’s Daily, Septem ber 3, 1965. 
2« S I  R . No. 54.
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issue, and  the w ounded and now strongly expressed nationalism  in 
C hina (nationalism  is not confined to C hina, of course), the struggle 
for hegemony of the w orld revolutionary  m ovem ent against the 
hegemony of the Soviet U nion becomes m ore understandable, if 
no more edifying, as do the clashes over the border, w hich are 
m anifestations of them , bu t which cannot be adequately  explained 
by any conflict of strictly na tional interests.
A nother very im p o rtan t light on this is provided by the m ounting  
c laim  th a t M ao T se-tung  T h o u g h t is the  m arxism -leninism  of the 
present era. W hen 1 was in  C hina we wrere asked: ‘‘W hat classics 
of m arxism -leninism  have you read?” In  answer to the question 
“W ere the works of M ao to  be considered as classics?” it  was said: 
“ Make u p  your own m in d ”, bu t I had a clear im pression even 
th en  th a t the Chinese believed the only reasonable answer was 
“Yes".
T here  were o ther, less definable indications th a t the Chinese 
believed th a t M ao should be considered the w orld ’s lead ing  m arxist
— even before S ta lin ’s death  — and  this developed fu rth e r after 
Stalin had gone.
Here it is in teresting  to note the Chinese analysis of S talin  m ade 
in 19(i3. S ta lin ’s strong points are listed as: having fought Tsarism  
and  propagated  m arxism ; having led the in te rna l and  ex ternal 
fight of the Soviet U nion  after L en in ’s death; of having upheld  
the line of industria lisation  and  collectivisation; of having  defended 
m arxism  against opportun ism  and  developed it; of hav ing  led the 
Soviet U nion to victory in the war; as having a correct foreign 
policy ‘on the w hole” and  (NB) of having stood in the forefront of 
the tide of history, gu id ing  the struggle.
His weaknesses are stated as: having sometimes fallen in to  m eta­
physics and  subjectivism , of having on occasions been divorced 
from  reality and the masses; of having confused different types of 
contradictions in  socialist society; of failing  to understand  class 
struggle in  socialist society correctly, and  m aking mistakes in  
hand ling  counter-revolutionaries; of failing to  u p ho ld  dem ocratic 
centralism ; of having m ade mistakes in  relations w ith o ther parties 
and  given some bad counsel in  the in te rna tiona l m ovem ent.27
W ith  the possible exception of uphold ing  dem ocratic centralism  
(and even this may be claim ed now the party  appara tus bu ilt by 
L iu  and  T en g  has been smashed and replaced by M ao’s), it  will 
be seen tha t Mao is claim ed to have all S ta lin ’s good points, while 
his specific fu rth er co n trib u tio n  has been in  the fields w here Stalin 
was weak. On Practice and  On Contradiction  dispose of the meta-
2" "O n the Question of Stalin ", P eking R eview  No. 38, Septem ber 20, 1963.
23
U 'S T R A I . I W  I .EFT REVIEW ()< lobcT-Novcmbcr
physics and subjectivism, the mass line ami mass movements dispose 
ol the divorce from  reality and the masses, and On the ('.owed 
H andling  o f  Contradictions A m ong  the People  disposes ol the con­
fusion ol different types ol contradictions, the incorrect handling  
of counter-revolutionaries and  class struggle in socialist society, 
l'.specially when taken together w ith the C u ltu ra l R evolution which 
is claim ed to  be a universal th ird  stage (after seizing power and 
establishing socialism) of revolution “carried out under the D ictator­
ship of the P ro le taria t to consolidate it — the need for a seizure ol 
power lim ited  to certain  spheres and certain  regions, not in the 
whole of society".2*
It is not necessary to w rite down the great achievem ents in thought 
and action of Mao Tse-tung, or to ignore the fact th a t he has been 
a tow ering figure on the world scene for over th irty  five years, or to 
deny the great im portance of p rom inen t leaders, to find in the 
above claims and  the adu la tion  so sedulously fostered, a “cult of 
the ind iv idual"  both  ridiculous and m enacing and for w hich off­
setting factors are not even sought by M ao and his followers, still 
less found.
A Criticism of the Chinese View of W orld Revolutionary Strategy
A lthough it has aspects which should  be taken in to  account,
I believe th a t overall the Chinese p icture  of the world revolutionary 
process is faulty  for the following m ain  reasons:
1 It is a p icture of the world so oversim plified as to be false. 
W hile correctly em phasising the trem endous im portance of the 
national liberation  movements, it is w rong in virtually  w riting  oil 
the revolu tionary  poten tia l of the w orking class of the West, and 
the new contradictions arising in  m odern capitalism  w hich can lead 
to a revolutionary  resurgence are not recognised, still less under­
stood. T h e  insistence of one sole m ethod  of struggle — arm ed 
struggle — does no t take account of or explain  the varied forms 
of anti-im perialist advance.
2 T ak in g  some concrete issues of w orld politics, the Chinese 
often seem to me to be wrong. For exam ple, on V ietnam  the evid­
ence th a t they have ham pered the delivery of supplies from  the 
Soviet U nion; in the M iddle Fast th e ir opposition to a political 
settlem ent between Arabs and Israelis, and the ir support for those 
extrem e A rab nationalist calls for the destruction  of Israel; their 
fanning of the India-Pakistan conflict, and  their preparedness to 
deal w ith W est G erm any, the U nited  States and o ther countries 
while denouncing  others who do so.
More generally, the problem  of “peaceful co-existence’’ is ap ­
proached by C hina, as it is by the Soviet U nion, from  the p o in t of
-s T h e  C ultural R evo lu tion  in China, p. 48.
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view of world strategic considerations as seen th rough  the ir own 
national eyes, mistakes often being m ade on this account. For 
exam ple the V ietnam ese were hostile to the CPSU at the tim e 
when it suggested they should “in the interests of peace” give up
I lie struggle against the US. O n the o ther hand , the Chinese were 
opposed to the V ietnam ese using political as well as m ilitary  means 
in the struggle against the US, apparen tly  u rg ing  the Vietnamese 
to “fight to the en d ’’ even if this m eant na tional suicide.
O n the question of the danger from  and im portance of avoiding 
nuclear war, the Chinese certainly err greatly, in  my view, by u n d er­
estim ation and  rid iculous “paper tiger’’ talk  (the w hile p u ttin g  
the ob tain ing  of the bom b as a num ber one objective). T h e  Soviet 
U nion correctly p o in tin g  to the un to ld  calam ity nuclear w ar would 
be, sometimes h in ts at the im m inence of it (during  the Czech inva­
sion for exam ple) to  cu rta il opposition  in  the nam e of the primacy 
of the larger issue.
3 By their deep-seated urge for hegemony, an d  the insistence 
on 100% acceptance of the ir line, the Chinese have a lienated  and 
repelled m any others. T h e  Com m unist P arty  of Jap an  was very 
close to C hina for m any years, includ ing  after the Japanese break 
w ith the CPSU, b u t it now denounces equally  the “great na tion  
chauvinism ’’ of both.
C uba was, in  political o rien ta tio n  in  the struggle in  L a tin  America 
(as well as in  a n u m b er of in te rn a l policies), closer to C hina than  
to the Soviet U nion, b u t still had  their in te rn a l affairs in terfered  
in  despite specific requests and  dem ands. A dep u ta tio n  of L atin  
Am erican com m unists from  a num ber of countries, m any of whom 
were favorably disposed to  Chinese policies, visited C hina in  late 
1964. T hey  were hectored  and  harangued by M ao Tse-tung because 
they would not accept Chinese leadership 100%.20 W e had  sim ilar 
experiences in  this country, as d id  m any others.
Some Theoretical Questions Involved
In  add ition  to the question  of m oral a r d  m ateria l incentives in  
socialist society m en tioned  earlier, a num ber of general theoretical 
problem s for socialists emerge from  consideration of the course of 
the Chinese R evolu tion  and  the Sino-Soviet conflict.
1 As touched on earlier, the different backgrounds of nations 
and  revolutions show enorm ous m u ltip lic ity  and  divergence, as 
do the ways to b u ild  socialism and  the n a tu re  of w hat is in  fact
20 T here  is some indication  of a greater flexibility in  present Chinese polity, 
w ith the emphasis on the  ab ility  of their adherents in o ther countries to exercise 
real political influence. See the  E dito rial in C om m unist, No. 5, reprin ted  in 
English in Soviet News A pril 29, 1969.
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bu ilt. A nd this m u ltip lic ity  and  divergence even increases fu rther 
as m ore socialist countries emerge, the existing ones evolve, and 
the character of various parts of the non-socialist w orld also changes. 
T h e  developm ent of previous social systems showed a sim ilar great 
variety. Franz Fanon spoke of the th ird  world countries not 
regard ing  themselves, in  the ir revolutions, as becom ing a part of 
the existing socialist world, b u t of using the fact th a t such a world 
existed  vis-a-vis capitalism , to  advance in  the ir own, perhaps very 
distinctive ways. H e spoke in  particu la r of the need for the peasants 
to be b rou g h t to advance themselves, regard ing  the town working 
class and  petty  and national bourgeoisie as com ing to stand in  the 
way of this because of their relatively privileged position and  a tti­
tudes.30
W ith o u t iden tify ing  M ao’s views w ith  Fanon's, J have already 
ind icated  tha t, uno rthodox  though they may be, the people’s com ­
m unes may have some viability  as a new way to tackle w hat was 
tackled in  q u ite  a different way in  the Soviet U nion. In  another 
aspect, the G erm an m arxist econom ist Kuczynski spoke of a new — 
the agricu ltu ra l — way to industria lisa tion .31
Some people get agitated w hen such things are po in ted  out, saying 
there are fundam entals, com m on features, universals w hich m ust be 
upheld  a t all costs, lest everything go to pot. B ut if experience is 
taken seriously the harvest of such universals, at least in  any usable 
form, is fairly  confined — a change in  political power, public 
ow nership in  place of private (both large scale and m uch of ind iv­
idual m eans of p roduction), mass involvem ent on a great scale in 
the revo lu tion  itself and  after (though in  some cases no t for so very 
long), an d  some form  of revolutionary  organisation. W ith  the 
enorm ous variety in  all of these w ith in  themselves, and  the continual 
fu rth e r com plicating of the conditions in  which revolutionary 
struggles proceed, repetition  of such “well-known tru th s” tells us 
precious little  abou t o u r own struggle.
Insistence by the leaders of CPC or the  CPSU and by those who 
follow them  on the one true pa th  (theirs) and  the one true in te r­
p re ta tion  of m arxism  o r m arxism -leninism  (theirs), ham pers ra ther 
th an  reveals an d  helps.32 W e must  a ttem p t o u r own analysis on the 
basis of o u r study and understand ing  of m arxist and  o ther writings 
a t the tim e, and  on the basis of our practical experiences of the 
struggle. In  p a rticu la r we should  e laborate  the principles of the 
socialist society we stand for. W e should  do  so still m ore boldly, still 
m ore thoroughly  th an  we have done h itherto .
so T h e  W retched of the Earth, Penguin.
31 See Australian L e ft Review , No. 4, 1966.
32 T h is problem  is no t confined to the CPC and the  CPSU.
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2 T h e  role of the hum an  will in  society, in  history: the re la tio n ­
ship between the objective and  the subjective. T h e  question here 
is not ‘can the subject exist w ithou t the ob jec t’, o r “w hich is p rim ­
ary’’, bu t of the in ter-relations between the two and  the degree to 
which the subjective elem ent, the hum an will, can open up new 
possibilities in social developm ent. I th ink  this degree has trad itio n ­
ally been underestim ated  in  m arxist theory, and  this has had, though 
not in  all cases in  practice (Lenin, Mao, Castro, H o Chi M inh), 
determ inistic and thus in h ib itin g  and dogm atic influences. But 
w hat can be said m ore than  this, if anything? At least we ought to 
ponder and  study the problem . I th ink  one difficulty (in  elaborating  
a theory on the question , th a t is) is tha t the problem  changes greatly 
from  tim e to tim e, and  requires a separate concrete analysis on 
each occasion. B ut there do seem to be “historic ju n c tu res” — 
revolutionary  situations of course are foremost here, b u t are not 
the only ones —  where the possibilities, the hum an  options, m ultip ly , 
and  a great effort of will can produce sta rtling  changes. S tuart 
Schram, whose biography of M ao Tse-tung33 should be read by all, 
regards M ao’s view th a t “the subjective creates the objective ”, as one 
of his chief characteristics.
It may be th a t M ao, a lthough  an opponen t of the old Chinese 
cu lture in  the m ain, is influenced to a degree by the mystical trad i­
tion  of all Eastern philosophy —  tha t is the search for tru th  
“w ith in ”, ra th e r th an  “w ith o u t”. C ertainly M ao’s account of 
“contrad ic tion” in  places follows very closely the ancien t Chinese 
view, and there is the failu re to distinguish it from  the W estern, 
H egelian an d  M arxist, view. T h is  is no t necessarily to condem n. 
Eastern philosophy has in  the m ain been trea ted  for too long in 
western society w ith  ignorance or contem pt.
3 R elated to this question  is th a t of the base and  superstructure 
(the terms being used here because they are trad itional, no t neces­
sarily definitive). T h e  Chinese say tha t despite state ow nership 
of the means of p roduction , the degree of m ateria l incentive, the 
differences of incom e, the existence of m arkets, the caste or class 
pow er exercised, and  the lack of ideological developm ent m ean 
th a t the Soviet U nion  has gone back to capitalism .
Soviet au thorities increasingly say tha t despite state and  collective 
ow nership the People’s R epub lic  of C hina does no t have as its m ain 
aim  the well-being and  all ro u n d  developm ent of the citi/en , is 
subord inating  the developm ent of p roduction  to its ow n hegemonic 
aims, is using v o lun ta rist leaps ra th e r th an  p lanned  developm ent, 
is using levelling an d  com pulsion instead of incentives, and  there is 
no partic ipa tion  by the masses in  the ru n n in g  of the economy, and
33 Political Leaders of the  T w en tie th  C entury series. Penguin, 1967.
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thus th a t it  is no t now, or is ceasing to  be a socialist country. I t is 
said:
It will be recalled th a t M arx and Engels never reduced the  concept of the 
economic system m erely to tjie form of property . Drawing a tten tion  to the  many- 
sided and  diverse a ttribu tes and m anifestations of production  relations, thev 
pointed ou t th a t state p roperty  contained only the "possibility of resolving" 
social contradictions in the economic sphere. (M arx and Engels, Works, Vol. 20, 
p. 290, Russian-Language edition) and th a t “ nationalisation of property" in 
different social conditions m ight no t produce the  same results and m ight have 
different social consequences. T he decisive role would be played by the  social 
n a tu re  of the  state, which exercised a trem endous influence on economic re la ­
tions/! •
I t  is in teresting  to com pare this view point w ith various Soviet 
statem ents abou t Yugoslavia at different times.35
W hile I discount the claims of bo th  as being taken far too far, one 
wishes each w ould look at th e ir own system as a whole in  the light 
of the strictures they make on others, and  the p o in t is, in  the theore­
tical sense, well taken. T h a t is, w hile collective ow nership is the 
necessary foundation  the actual n a tu re  and  all ro u n d  assessment 
of the social system cannot a t all be adequately  em braced in  this. 
T h a t is, ‘socialism ” is an abstraction w hich has to be clothed in 
flesh an d  blood. A nd m any of us, un fortunate ly , do no t like the 
flesh and  blood in  w hich it has h ith e rto  been clothed in  most cases
— and n e ither do m any others. Especially do questions of the form  
of state, self-m anagem ent, the role of the party, in te llectual and 
o ther freedom s —  th a t is m ainly questions of socialist democracy — 
arise as n e ither adequately  treated  theoretically  nor developed 
practically. As far as the Soviet U n ion  an d  C hina are concerned 
neither accords w ith  w hat I w ould describe as “socialist dem ocracy” ; 
bu t I w ould  also say th a t both could  develop in  th a t d irection — 
th a t is, there is no t one only possible sta rting  p o in t for this.
Probably  the m ost im p o rtan t p o in t connected w ith the question 
of the base and  superstructure in  C hina and  the Soviet U nion at 
the present tim e is th a t of war. H itherto , alm ost all m arxists and 
socialists have held  that, given pub lic  ow nership of the means 
of p rodu c tio n  as the basis, a contradictory  phenom enon of the po li­
tical superstructure, such as w ar was impossible. Clearly, this is no 
longer tenable, an d  one of the most d istu rb ing  features of all in 
the present situation  is that, along the lines of the preceding argu­
m ent, b o th  C hina and  the Soviet U n ion  are p reparing  the ir people 
ideologically for w ar by giving prom inence to  views th a t the o ther 
is “non-socialist”, “a id ing  im peria lism ” etc. T h e  populations of
34 E dito rial in  C om m unist No. 4, 1969, published  in  English in  Soviet News 
A pril 15, 1969.
35 e.g. Suslov, R eport to the  C entral C om m ittee CPSU, February  14, 1964.
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ljotli countries have been b rough t u p  on the simple m arxism  which 
says that w ar betw een socialist countries is impossible. B ut wars 
between capitalist countries, or between cap italist and socialist 
countries (starting always w ith the capitalist countries) are acknow ­
ledged as com m on phenom ena.
■1 R elated to these questions again, are those o£ class and  class 
struggle in  socialist society. In  a previous article30 I a ttem pted  to 
exam ine this p roblem  by po in ting  out th a t the identification  of 
class in capitalist society by reference to relations of ow nership alone 
was far too general, an d  tha t this m ight be extended to recognition 
of “necessary re la tions” understood in  a w ider sense, and  tha t this 
w ould have some bearing  on socialist society also. I th in k  th a t the 
problem  under socialism needs to be exam ined concretely, bu t socio­
logical analysis has been lacking.
U nder socialism, in  every country, we have seen the developm ent 
of big struggles after the victory of the revolution , w hen the un ity  
engendered by the actual struggle to overthrow  the o ld  system, and 
the mass enthusiasm  on w hich it is based, tends to  disintegrate.
W hat needs to be done is to find different ways of conducting  po li­
tical life from  th a t w hich has existed h itherto , where those w ho differ 
are labelled as “class enem ies”, and  the o ld  class passions an d  strug­
gles are re-aroused in  w hat are qu ite  different circumstances. W hat 
is needed, speaking in  general, is an o rien ta tion  towards fu ll develop­
m ent of socialist democracy and  acceptance of some form  of 
political pluralism . Few, if any, of those declared to be enemies, 
w hether B ukharin , L iu  Shao-chi or Dubcek, can seriously be con­
sidered as “capitalist agents”, and it only discredits socialism to 
declare th a t they are.
Tenta tive  Conclusions
1 T h e  in te rn a l crisis in  C hina has been basically resolved for some 
tim e to come, bu t big divisions still rem ain.
2 T h e  line on in te rn a l questions now being p u t in to  operation 
has prospects of some success, b u t the ex ten t of this is doubtfu l.
3 T h e  line adop ted  by C hina on in te rn a tio n a l questions is u n ­
likely to have the degree of im pact expected, th ough  it  will have 
some.
4 All these questions, in  th e ir  concrete outcom e, hinge to  a 
great degree on the course of developm ent of the Sino-Soviet con­
flict. M easures of invasion, or greater m ilitary  action by one side 
or the o ther w ould have to be condem ned, w ould  have incalculable 
consequences and  w ould face the socialist m ovem ent in ternationally  
and  in  every country  w ith  the need to rebu ild  from  the g round  up.
36 Eric Aarons, Class and R u lin g  Class, Com m unist Party  Publication, 1969.
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